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aTheory and methods of regulation, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands; bAdministrative
law, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Both at the European and at the Member State level, evidence-based law
making is on the rise. So far, the attention has mostly gone to methods of ex
ante evaluation used by the legislature. In this article, we argue that more
attention should be paid to the role of courts as regulatory watchdogs. The
CJEU seems to move in this direction by increasingly conducting a procedural
(proportionality) review of legislation. However, the CJEU does not yet
scrutinise the underlying data or the scientific evidence on which
consultations, impact assessments and other forms of ex ante evaluation rest.
This means that when these evaluations are based on poor quality data, this
will also affect the CJEU’s judgement. For Dutch courts, the situation is
different. They are so far unwilling to include ex ante evaluations or empirical
data in a proportionality review of legislation, although the Advisory Division
of the Council of State emphasises the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality in its policy-analytical review of draft legislation. This raises the
question: why do courts avoid assessing the reliability of (scientific) evidence
used by legislators and regulators? Here they might learn something from the
US, where the Supreme Court developed its Daubert doctrine in order to
guide courts in filtering out ‘junk science’ from the law-making process.
KEYWORDS Evidence-based; proportionality test; Daubert
1. Introduction
Both in the legislative policy of the EU and its member states, evidence-based
law- and policy-making are on the rise. The idea of ‘evidence-based law-
making’ is relatively new, but draws on an extensive body of ‘evidence-
based’ areas, such as evidence-based medicine, evidence-based policy,
evidence-based management and so on.1 There has been a spillover from
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these areas to the field of legislation, where we have witnessed a general shift
from codification of existing customs and morals to modification of human
behaviour.2 Antokolskaia describes the move towards evidence-based legis-
lation as: ‘the legislator in his choices for legislative interventions takes a
rational and focused approach and does not let himself be guided by just pol-
itical and ideological reasoning, but also by relevant results of scientific
inquiry assessing the (expected) effectiveness of those interventions.’3
Much has been written about the virtues of evidence-based legislation.4
However, sceptics have argued that one should not overestimate the advantages
of an evidence-based approach because policy makers and politicians are not
always willing to take scientific insights into account. Putting too much empha-
sis on the need to underpin legislative drafts with empirical data and scientific
evidence could even produce counter-productive effects and turn evidence-
based policy-making into policy-based evidence-making.5 Taking a critical
look at current practices, one may wonder if this is not already going on.
Impact assessments, for example, rarely lead to a choice for alternatives to legis-
lation, consultations seldom result in significant changes to legislative drafts and
the results of legislative experiments are sometimes simply neglected. In other
words, how relevant and reliable are existing procedures that should make our
laws and regulations more evidence-based?
2. How evidence-based is evidence-based law: and what is the
role of courts?
Regulatory oversight is still a weak spot in the regulatory policies of the EU
and probably in most of its member states. At the EU level, Directorate Gen-
erals (DGs) are primarily responsible for carrying out impact assessments and
the supervision by institutions, such as Regulatory Scrutiny Boards, Audit
Offices and Ombudsmen, is relatively weak. These bodies are usually not
capable of blocking bad legislative drafts from passing through. So far, little
2T. Koopmans, ‘De rol van de wetgever’ in Herman Schoordijk, W. van der Grinten, C. Polak and G. Langemeijer
(eds.), Honderd jaar rechtsleven: de Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 1870–1970 (Tjeenk Willink 1970) 221–235.
3M. Antokolskaia, ‘Van politiek gestuurde wetgeving naar evidence-based wetgeving: Nog een lange weg
te gaan’ in W. van Boom, I. Giesen and A. Verheij (eds.), Capita Civilogie. Handboek Empirie en Privaatrecht
(Boom Juridische uitgevers 2013) 174. R. van Gestel, ‘Evidence-based Lawmaking and the Quality of
Legislation: Regulatory Impact Assessments in the European Union and the Netherlands’ in
H. Schäffer and J. Iliopoulos-Strangas (eds.), State Modernization in Europe (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag
2007) 141 defines evidence-based legislation as: ‘laws and policy initiatives are to be supported by
research evidence and policies are preferably introduced on a trial and error basis. Implementation
should only be considered on a larger scale after an evaluation of experiments or pilots have taken
place.’
4P. Schwintowski, … denn sie wissen nicht, was sie tun! - Warum Politik und Gesetzgebung so oft irren: Ein
Plädoyer für die Neue Analytische Regelungswissenschaft (Nomos 2014) and A. Seidman and R. Seidman,
‘ILTAM: Drafting Evidence-based Legislation for Democratic Social Change’ [2009] Boston University Law
Review 448–485.
5House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Advice, Risk and Evidence Based Policy
Making, Seventh Report of Session 2005–2006 (House of Commons, London November 2006) 47.
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attention has gone to the role of courts as regulatory watchdogs.6 In a way, this
is understandable because each branch of government has its own consti-
tutional role to play, which explains why courts are reluctant to invade the leg-
islative domain.7
Nevertheless, as Lenaerts has observed,8 cases such as Vodafone, Volker und
Markus Schecke, and Test-Achats are judgments revealing that the CJEU is
willing to follow an approach that focuses on improving the evidence-base of
the decision-making process of EU institutions, rather than on second-guessing
their substantive findings. In these cases, the CJEU conducts a procedural review,
which tests to what extent EU political institutions have followed the procedural
steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties and by the different EU insti-
tutions themselves (e.g. think of impact assessment (IA) and consultation guide-
lines developed by the Commission). Such a review may prevent the CJEU from
entering the realm of politics. Unfortunately, however, it cannot capture the
substantive truth-value or validity of the empirical basis on which laws and regu-
lations rest. Hence, a procedural test may either be under-inclusive (e.g. legis-
lation is prepared according to all the guidelines for drafting, consultation,
impact assessment but the content of the rules still has major flaws) or over-
inclusive (e.g. passing a multitude of tests becomes a goal in itself and distracts
the attention from achieving the goals of the legislature).
3. Research problem and order of the argument
There are some important differences between how the CJEU scrutinises
legislation and how the Dutch highest courts, and especially the Council of
State, do this. Article 120 of the Dutch constitution, for example, prohibits
courts from testing the constitutionality of statutes.9
A first step in this paper is to compare how the CJEU and Dutch courts
apply a proportionality test. In the Netherlands, there is increasing criticism
that the case law of the Council of State is biased towards protecting the gov-
ernment against citizens who have legitimate doubts about the validity of laws
and regulations.10 Although the intensity of the proportionality review differs,
6For an exception see: P. Popelier, ‘Preliminary Comments on the Role of Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs’
2012 Legisprudence 257–270.
7At least that is the idea behind the Trias Politica doctrine derived from the work of Montesquieu. To what
extent this doctrine is still useful as a model to understand the relationships between the principle
law-making powers in modern administrative states is up for debate. See B. Ackerman, ‘Good-bye Mon-
tesquieu’ in S. Rose-Ackerman and P. Lindseth, Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2010)
128–133 and B. Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ 2000 113 Harvard Law Review 633.
8K. Lenaerts, ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review’ [2012] Yearbook of European
Law 3–16.
9Article 120 reads: ‘The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the
courts.’
10Even the former chairman of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State and former
Minister of Justice in the Netherlands, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, now criticises the marginal review that the
court applies when deciding over the quality of legislation. See E. Hirsch Ballin, ‘Dynamiek in de
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both courts seem to share a dilemma,11 which forms the principle background
of our contribution, namely:
To what extent does a proportionality review of laws and regulations by the
judiciary require that courts assess the methodological rigour of ex ante evalu-
ations conducted during the preparation of laws and scrutinize the empirical
data and scientific evidence used to underpin regulatory decisions?
In order to answer this question, we will summarise how the proportionality
principle is explained in both legal systems. After that, we will explore the case
law of the CJEU, the Dutch Supreme Court and Council of State looking for
examples where a proportionality test was used to scrutinise laws or regu-
lations. Are courts aware of the fact that the validity of the evidence on
which laws and regulations rest may affect the quality of law making? After
all, even if all the procedural steps prescribed by ex ante evaluation policies
are followed, this does not imply that laws and regulations will reach their
aim. Munday has even challenged the idea that courts should rely on regulat-
ory impact assessments in the case of statutory interpretation. He believes
impact assessments are politicised documents, which might undermine the
quality of judicial decisions.12 Should courts therefore not be more critical
about the empirical data and scientific evidence that is used in the drafting
of laws and regulations? If so, are courts capable of doing this?13 Perhaps
the CJEU and Dutch courts could learn something here from the Dauber
test, which was developed by the US Supreme Court to scrutinise the
quality of expert witnesses and other kinds of scientific evidence. Therefore,
we will list some possible advantages of applying such a test to a European
context.
4. The review of legislative rationality in the Netherlands
4.1. Proportionality in the Dutch legislative context
In the Netherlands, subsidiarity and proportionality are important indicators
for legislative quality.14 The subsidiarity principle requires that regulatory
decisions should as much as possible be left to local authorities and non-
bestuursrechtspraak’ in E. Hirsch Ballin, R. Ortlep and A. Tollenaar, Rechtsontwikkeling door de bestuurs-
rechter (Boom Juridische uitgevers 2015) 9–58.
11The dilemma has to do with the idea that a mere procedural review in which courts scrutinise the extent
to which the legislature has taken its own procedural guidelines and ex ante evaluations into account
may be relatively safe because it keeps courts away from policy decisions. On the other hand, plain pro-
cedural review might not suffice in case the evidence on which the legislature relies is flawed.
12R. Munday, ‘In the Wake of ‘Good Governance’: Impact Assessments and the Politicisation of Statutory
Interpretation’ (2008) 71 The Modern Law Review 385–412.
13See for instance: Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 309 (1997): ‘Congress has the capacity to inves-
tigate and analyze facts beyond anything the judiciary could match.’
14An extensive explanation of these (and other) quality indicators can be found in: Ministry of Justice,
Legislation in perspective, The Hague 1991.
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governmental organisations.15 The Dutch legislature prefers self-regulation to
governmental regulation, whenever this is possible.16 Consequently, the
guidelines for legislative drafting introduce a number of issues that should
be taken into account before new laws are introduced. Instruction 7 of
these guidelines determines that:
Before deciding to introduce a regulation, the following steps shall be taken:
a. knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances shall be acquired; b. the
objectives being aimed at shall be defined in the most specific, accurate terms
possible; c. it shall be investigated whether the objectives selected can be
achieved using the capacity for self-regulation in the sector or sectors concerned
or whether government intervention is required; d. if government intervention
is necessary, it shall be investigated whether the objectives in view could be
achieved by amending or making better use of existing instruments, or, if
this proves impossible, what other options are available; e. the various
options shall be compared and considered with care.17
Dutch legislators should refrain from direct intervention as much as possible
and instead provide a general framework for self-regulation where possible. In
practice, however, the explanation of why non-regulation or self-regulation
has not been preferred over governmental regulation is often absent or
weak.18,19 Although proportionality is usually mentioned in the same
breath with subsidiarity, it has a different meaning. Proportionality depends
on other norms because it can only function in relation to legislative or con-
stitutional provisions that leave a certain margin of discretion. It requires a
balancing of interests in which the composite weight of the disadvantages
of a regulatory decision for the addressees may not outweigh the advantages
to the general interest.20
In order to determine whether a certain regulatory measure is proportion-
ate, one needs to know the aims of the measure and the availability of different
means to accomplish them. Without this, it is impossible to decide whether
regulatory interventions are necessary and appropriate, let alone because a
comparison between alternative measures would be impossible. Such a balan-
cing of interests underlines the political nature of legislative drafting. Hence, if
laws do not produce their intended effects, citizens must primarily look to the
15The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as legislative quality indicators can be found in the
Dutch Guidelines for legislative drafting. See: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005730/2011-05-11.
16The ideas behind the Dutch emphasis on self-regulation are heavily influenced by the ideas of Niklas
Luhmann and Gunter Teubner as can be witnessed in the Green paper: Zicht op wetgeving, Parliamen-
tary Papers II, 1990–1991, 22008, nr 2.
17Ibid., n 16.
18Instruction 212, under b, of the guidelines on legislative drafting requires that the necessity of regulatory
intervention and the consideration of alternative modes of regulation are always presented in the expla-
natory memorandum of a proposed bill.
19R. van Gestel and M. Menting, ‘Ex Ante Evaluation and Alternatives to Legislation: Going Dutch?’ 2011
Statute Law Review 209–226.
20A. de Moor-van Vugt, Maten en gewichten: Het evenredigheidsbeginsel in Europees perspectief (Kluwer
1995) 16.
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government for action.21 This does not imply, though, that the judiciary has
no role to play. However, in the Dutch context, this role is limited because of
article 120 of the constitution. The core of that rule includes a prohibition on
procedural testing,22 on substantive testing, as well as on the testing of pre-
paratory actions.23 In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the Dutch consti-
tution even prohibits courts from testing a statutory provision in the light
of fundamental principles of law.24 The idea behind all this is to protect the
primacy of parliament.25
With regard to secondary legislation (e.g. Royal decrees and Ministerial
regulations), the situation is different. Administrative courts are not allowed
to review generally binding regulations,26 but litigants may question the leg-
ality of an administrative order because of the unlawfulness of the underlying
statutory provision.27 Residual legal protection is provided by Dutch civil
courts for which the Dutch Supreme Court set a standard in its landmark
ruling Landbouwvliegers.28 In this case, it decided that civil courts might
review secondary legislation against the backdrop of general principles of
law.29
In Landbouwvliegers, aviation companies complained that new zoning
requirements for spraying pesticides constituted a disproportionate limitation
of their rights, especially now that the government refused to provide financial
compensation for a 50 to 70% loss of return for the airlines. The Supreme
Court, however, found that the consequences of the rules were not dispropor-
tionate in light of the unavoidable balancing of interest between the economic
loss for the companies and the risks for the health and safety of the public.30
4.2. Assessment of the proportionality of Dutch laws via the ECHR
The most important route towards a proportionality review of legislative
decisions in the Netherlands runs via the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). First courts will need to decide whether a law or regulation
21A. Flückiger, ‘Effectiveness: A New Constitutional Principle’ 2009 Legislação 189.
22Dutch Supreme Court 27 January 1961, ECLI:NL:PHR:1961:AG2059 (Prof. Van den Bergh).
23Dutch Supreme Court 19 November 1999, ECLI:NL:PHR:1999:AA1056 (Tegelen/Limburg).
24Dutch Supreme Court 14 April 1989, ECLI:NL:PHR:1989:AD5725 (Harmonisatiewet).
25See for a more elaborate explanation of this idea of the primacy of the legislature: R. van Gestel, ‘The
‘Deparliamentarisation’ of Legislation’ [2013] 9, 2 Utrecht Law Review, 106–122 <https://www.
utrechtlawreview.org/articles/abstract/10.18352/ulr.230/>
26Article 8:2 of the General Administrative Law Act.
27A. Bok, Rechterlijke toetsing van regelgeving (Kluwer 1991) 4–5.
28See recently Dutch Supreme Court 22 May 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1296 (Privacy First). This residual pro-
tection is only possible in case of a lack of sufficient legal protection in the proceedings before the
administrative courts.
29Dutch Supreme Court 16 May 1986, ECLI:NL:PHR:1986:AC9354.
30S. Stoter, Belangenafweging door de wetgever. Een juridisch onderzoek naar criteria voor de belangenaf-
weging van de formele wetgever in relatie tot de belangenafweging op bestuursniveau (Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2000) 69–70.
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is compatible with fundamental rights.31 If this is the case, a court must decide
if the application of the rules in concrete cases may create unreasonable con-
sequences. In both situations, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
will apply a threefold test,32 as soon as it has established that there might be a
limitation of human rights ‘prescribed by law’.
According to the ECtHR, Dutch courts first need to investigate whether a
statute that restricts fundamental rights has a legitimate aim. Sometimes the
treaty itself is clear about what sort of aims might justify a limitation of rights,
as is the case in the articles 8–11 ECHR. In other cases, the court needs to
decide for itself what sort of aims are legitimate. In practice, this might be
quite difficult. The legislative history may be unclear and, when a statute is
old, one may have doubts whether the legislature would still interpret the
aims in the same vein. Furthermore, the limitation clauses of articles 8-11
of the ECHR are so broad that most legislative aims can be brought within
these categories as long as the measures are ‘necessary in a democratic
society’.33 This means there should be a pressing social need that is propor-
tionate to aims pursued by the legislature.34
The second step in the review process for courts is to investigate whether
legislative measures are ‘necessary’, ‘relevant’ and ‘sufficient’ to reach the aims
set by the legislature. These criteria are interrelated because when answering if
a certain measure is necessary, it is essential to know if there are regulatory
alternatives to achieving the same goals.35 It is understandable that the
ECtHR leaves a wide margin of appreciation for governments because they
are normally better equipped to decide what sort of measures are most effec-
tive to achieve certain aims. This is also where ex ante evaluation comes into
play since the effectiveness of legislative measures is usually determined via
different methods of ex ante evaluation, such as stakeholder consultations,
impact assessments and cost-benefit analysis.
The judiciary is not capable of conducting ex ante evaluations but has the
advantage of deciding with hindsight. The longer the period between
31See: ECHR April 22 1993, 15070/89, § 20–24 (Modinos/Cyprus); ECHR October 22 1981, 7525/76, § 40–41
(Dudgeon/United Kingdom) and ECHR October 26 1988, 10581/83, § 28–34 (Norris/Ireland).
32J. Vande Lanotte and Y. Haeck, Handboek EVRM. Deel 1: Algemene beginselen (Intersentia 2005) 123.
33Legitimate interests include national security; territorial integrity and public safety; the economic well-
being of the country; the prevention of disorder or crime; the protection of health or morals; the protec-
tion of the rights, freedoms, and reputation of others; the prevention of disclosure of information
received in confidence; and the impartiality of the judiciary. See R. Pati, ‘Rights and their Limits: The
Constitution for Europe in International and Comparative Legal Perspective’ Berkeley Journal of Inter-
national Law 252.
34See ECtHR March 23 1983, 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, 7136/75, § 97 (Silver
e.a./Verenigd Koninkrijk) and ECtHR 7 December 1976, 5493/72. (Handyside v. the United Kingdom).
35In that case the legislative measure is considered to be disproportionate. A. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Van propor-
tionaliteit en appreciatiemarge: de noodzakelijkheidstoets in de jurisprudentie van het EHRM’, in: A.J.
Nieuwenhuis, B.J. Schueler and C.M. Zoethout (eds.), Proportionaliteit in het publiekrecht (Kluwer
2005), 37. See for an example: ECtHR November 24 1993, 13914/88, 15041/89, 15717/89, 15779/89
en 17207/90, § 39–44 (Lentia a.o./Austria).
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enactment and judicial intervention, the more likely it will therefore become
that there are relevant independent sources that can provide information
about the effectiveness of laws and regulations, such as ex post evaluations,
scholarly publications, or amicus curiae briefs. Nonetheless, what will
remain difficult for courts is to provide an objective opinion about the con-
sideration of alternatives, because this would imply an inquiry into the avail-
ability of regulatory alternatives and an estimation of their effectiveness. This
does not imply, though, that courts are unable to assess to what extent the leg-
islature has conducted a proper ex ante evaluation, especially in case there are
official guidelines, manuals or procedures for this.36
A final step in the judicial proportionality test concerns whether there is a
reasonable balance between the legitimate aims pursued by the legislature and
the rights affected by the applicable legislative intervention. There is no objec-
tive method or yardstick to guide this balancing act. Moreover, where courts
are used to balancing interests in concrete cases, the legislature needs to do
this on a higher level of abstraction taking into account all possible future cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, Gerards has argued that courts could more often
force legislators to provide more and better information about the specific
aims of legislative drafts and about the facts and (empirical) evidence on
which legislative decisions rest.37 In case the legislature cannot or will not
supply this information, courts could consider issuing a ‘declaration of inap-
plicability’. This would send a clear message to the legislature and facilitate a
more intensive judicial review of legislation without overruling democratic
legislative decisions.38
4.3. Legislative rationality testing in practice by Dutch highest
administrative courts
Most of the cases in which (primary) legislation is reviewed by Dutch highest
administrative courts concern infringements against European human rights
law or EU law. However, there have been hardly any attempts so far to chal-
lenge the evidence on which laws and regulations rest. There are a few excep-
tions to this rule, though. A still interesting older example is the Fluoriderings
36For the Dutch situation this is certainly the case. Not only are there Guidelines for legislative drafting,
which contain detailed provision as the steps that should be taken during the preparation of legislative
drafts, but there is also the Integrated Assessment Framework (IAK) that guides draftsmen via an elec-
tronic programme through the different steps of the ex ante evaluation process.
37J. Gerards, ‘Wisselwerking tussen wetgever en rechter – naar een betere dialoog’ in R. de Lange (ed.),
Wetgever en grondrechten, Publicaties van de Staatsrechtkring (Wolf Legal Publishers 2008) 174–175,
179–180.
38Although Gerards, inspired by the work of John Hart Ely, appears to accept that under certain circum-
stances, especially when the regular democratic decision-making process is frustrated, there might be a
justification for judicial activism and interventions in the legislative process by courts. In the same sense:
T. Koopmans, ‘Rechterlijk activisme in Europees rechtelijk perspectief’ in P. van Dijk (ed.), De relatie
tussen wetgever en rechter in een tijd van rechterlijk activisme (KNAW 1989) 37.
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case that was decided by the Supreme Court in 1970. It concerned a decision
of the Amsterdam public water supply company to add fluoride to the drink-
ing water to fight tooth decay. Citizens took the company to court because
they did not believe the positive effects that fluoride was supposed to have.
The Supreme Court ruled that:
[T]he addition of substances to our drinking water in order to serve a goal that
lies completely outside the actual purpose of the public water supply […] is
such a fundamental decision, that without an explicit legal basis, the Amster-
dam water company may not assume to have the freedom to add fluoride to
the drinking water as part of the public task assigned to it by article 4,
section 1 of the Water Supply Act.39
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that adding substances to the drinking
water for medical purposes without an explicit legal basis constitutes a form of
‘detournement de pouvoir’. Because the court decided the water-supply
company had no competence to add fluoride to the water it did not get to
a proportionality test stricto sensu. That is a pity because whether the fluori-
dation of drinking water actually had a preventative effect on tooth decay
without having other adverse health effects was, and still is, contested in
the medical world.40 It would have been interesting to learn how the
Supreme Court had operated in case there had been a legal basis for the
water-supply company to add substances to the drinking water for healthcare
purposes.
A case in which legislation was challenged through a proportionality
review is the Alcohol lock case.41 In this case the administrative authority
responsible for driver safety (Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheid) required
someone arrested for drunken driving to participate in a so-called alcohol
lock programme in which the offender gets a special licence for driving a
car that contains an alcohol lock, which prevents the car from starting
before the driver passes a breathalyser test. The offender needs to bear the
costs for the installation of an alcohol lock in his car. Refusing to participate
in the programme results in an invalidation of one’s licence for five years. The
offender in this case appealed against the decision to the Administrative Jur-
isdiction Division of the Council of State (AJD), claiming that Article 17 of the
regulation introducing the alcohol lock measure (Regeling maatregelen rij-
vaardigheid en geschiktheid 2011) is disproportionate in its consequences.
The AJD invalidated the regulation because of an infringement of Article
3:4 of the General Administrative Law Act. This provision holds that the
39Dutch Supreme Court 22 June 1973, ECLI:NL:PHR:1973:AD2208 (Fluoridering II).
40See: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laneur/article/PIIS1474-4422(14)70119-X/fulltext?hc_location=
ufi.
41The Council of State: 4 March 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:622.
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consequences of a regulation may not be disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued by the legislature.
Interestingly, the AJD collected evidence for its decision from past and
pending cases. Based on the experience in these cases it noticed that: (a)
the costs of the alcohol lock measure for citizens were, in practice, much
higher than anticipated by the legislature. Offenders, who could not afford
the installation of alcohol locks in their cars, were automatically confronted
with an invalidation of their driver’s licence for five years. Among those offen-
ders are people who need their licence to make a living. Even for those who
can afford to pay for the alcohol lock in their car, the consequences may be
disproportionate. Just think of the case in which the offender needs to drive
cars other than his or her own (e.g. the taxi driver). In such a case, the offender
runs the risk of losing their job. Although the AJD found the consequences of
the alcohol lock regulation in the individual case disproportionate, it refused
to decide over the necessity and suitability of the alcohol lock programme to
achieve the legislature’s aims. This is a pity because it is exactly on these points
the Advisory Division of the Council of State (AD) had criticised the alcohol
lock programme. The AD, for example, noticed that the regulation was not
linked with an intensive treatment programme for offenders to overcome
their addiction, which left the underlying (addiction) problems intact. More-
over, the AD cast doubts on the susceptibility of the programme to fraud.
Hence, there were previous doubts as to how effective the programme was
going to be and whether there were no less intrusive alternative measures
available to achieve the same goals.42
Although the impression among Dutch politicians increasingly seems to be
that courts are using fundamental rights and legal principles to steal terrain
from the legislature, in reality Dutch courts leave the legislature a broad
margin of appreciation.43 Seldom do they interfere with policy decisions
made by the legislature. A prominent exception is the ruling of the
Supreme Court with regard to the anti-smoking legislation in Dutch pubs
and restaurants that, until recently, allowed smoking in bars where the
owner or manager was the only employee.44 In 2014, the Supreme Court
ruled that this exception ran against article 8(2) of the Framework convention
on Tobacco Control.45 After having determined that this provision is directly
applicable in the national legal order, the Supreme Court decided that the
convention obliges parties to the treaty to introduce effective protection
against exposure to tobacco smoke in public buildings in order to prevent
42Advisory opinion W09.08.0371/IV. See: https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/zoeken-in-adviezen/tekst-
advies.html?id=8501&summary_only=&q=alcoholslot.
43J. Gerards and J. Fleuren (eds.), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the
judgments of the ECtHR in National Case Law (Intersentia 2014).
44Dutch Supreme Court 10 October 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2928.
45See: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf.
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serious health risks. In addition, the court ruled that the mere existence of a
certain discretion, left by the treaty-giver to national legislatures, does not
prohibit that Article 8(2) is directly applicable. This provision would not
leave any room for an exception to allow for smoking in smaller pubs with
single owners.
4.5. Legislative rationality testing by the advisory division of the
Council of State
There are few cases where the highest administrative courts appear to be
willing to look beyond the text and the explanatory memorandum of a
piece of legislation in order to challenge the evidence and (empirical) assump-
tions on which the rules are built. This is remarkable because the ECtHR
increasingly seems to apply a procedural test to scrutinise the proportionality
of legislation.46 It is also strange because during the preparatory phase of the
law-making process, the AD of the Council of State points on a regular basis
to a lack of valid evidence to support the assumptions on which a certain leg-
islative draft is based in order to warn the legislature of an infringement of the
proportionality principle.
To mention just a few examples: when the legislature tried to introduce a
ban of Muslim women wearing burqas or niqabs, the AD concluded that a
complete ban would not be necessary in a democratic society to protect the
public. The AD saw no evidence that wearing such clothing resulted in a
threat to public safety, while a ban could not prevent dangerous criminal
activities.47 In the case of a law that was meant to regulate the court
custody of perpetrators of domestic violence for ten days, with the possibility
of an extension, the AD advised shortening the cooling down period and
increasing the procedural warranties of the person to be placed in custody
in case of extension. The AD not only drew attention to the limited added
value of custody compared with already available measures to deal with
crisis situations, but also referred to existing research with regard to the
effects of custody in Austria and Germany.48 A final example concerns a
law that provided the government with the right to send back ‘troubled
youngsters’ from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba who had spent less than
three years in the Netherlands.49 One of the reasons the AD saw this
measure as a disproportionate infringement of their EU right to citizenship,
46P. Popelier and C. van den Heyning, ‘Procedural Rationality: Giving Teeth to the Proportionality Analysis’
(2013) European Constitutional Law Review 230, 252.
47Parliamentary Papers II 2007–2008, 31 108, nr. 4 and 2011/2012, 33 165, nr. 4. The AD refers to an expert
report. See: Overwegingen bij een boerkaverbod/Zienswijze van de deskundigen inzake een verbod op
gezichtsbedekkende kleding, 3 November 2006, Bijlage bij Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 29 754, nr. 91, blz.
60.
48Parliamentary Papers 2005–2006, 30 657, nr. 4, p. 7.
49Parliamentary Papers 2006–2007, 30 962, nr. 4.
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was that statistics showed that the majority of these people had already been in
the Netherlands for more than three years, which made it very unlikely that
the measure could be effective.
In these and other cases, the AD apparently wants to show to the legislature
that if certain regulatory measures are not capable of achieving the aims men-
tioned in the act, or if lighter alternatives could reach the same result, the leg-
islative draft runs against higher law and does not deserve to be passed. The
AD apparently tries to anticipate how national courts and the ECtHR would
react in case they have to decide over the legality of the draft after its enact-
ment. This makes it even more surprising that Dutch highest administrative
courts remain reluctant to look at ex ante evaluations or empirical evidence
when they review the proportionality of laws and regulations.
5. Review of legislative rationality by the CJEU
5.1. Proportionality in the EU’s legislative context
Article 52 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU reads:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others.
With regard to how legislators and regulators should use their competences,
Article 5(1) TEU contains a basic rule: ‘The limits of Union competences are
governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is gov-
erned by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.’ The article pro-
vides a three-stage test. The first stage is to find out if EU institutions are
competent to regulate in order to attain objectives set out in the treaties or
in secondary legislation. This is important because the EU legislature has
no ‘Kompetenz-kompetenz’, indicating there is nothing to regulate as long
as there is no conferral of regulatory competences allowing EU institutions
to act.50 In that case, there is also a violation of the subsidiarity principle.
After all, subsidiarity entails that in areas, which do not fall within its exclusive
competence of the EU, the Union shall act only in case the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.51
In case there is a legal basis, the subsidiarity principle requires in stage two
an explanation of why EU institutions are better equipped than national
50In practice this is quite rare because of the wide range of competences since the Lisbon Treaty and the
availability of ‘flexibility clauses’, such as the one laid down in article 352 TFEU, which may enable EU
institutions to act even if a specific competence is lacking.
51Article 5(3) TEU.
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authorities to regulate the problem. The only problem is that the ‘subsidiarity
test’ laid down in the subsidiarity protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amster-
dam seldom signals that the EU should refrain from action.52 The yellow/
orange card procedure through which Member States can file complaints
against EU legislative action has not proven to be an effective remedy
against competence creep.53 Finally, the CJEU is reluctant to strike down
EU legislation because of a breach of the subsidiarity principle because this
is considered to be a political matter.54 However, some authors have argued
that by using impact assessments and arguments from the Early warning
system, the CJEU could strengthen its review of the subsidiarity principle
without politicising its jurisprudence.55
Stage three concerns proportionality stricto sensu. Here, article 5(4) TEU
determines: ‘Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form
of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives
of the Treaties.’ This necessity test implies that EU laws and regulations
should not go further than necessary to achieve the required policy goals. It
also implies there are no less intrusive alternatives to accomplish these
goals. This clarification follows from the case law of the CJEU,56 and so
does the requirement of suitability demanding that laws and regulations
should be fit for purpose. It requires a logical connection between means
and ends in legislative policy making. Proportionality means that regulatory
instruments should be kept as simple and ‘light’ as possible without endanger-
ing the effectiveness of the policy.57
In practice, the Commission is responsible for an assessment of the propor-
tionality of legislative drafts for which it usually consults stakeholders. Con-
sultations need to take into account the regional and local dimension of
legislative acts where appropriate. Only in case of exceptional urgency may
consultations be left aside but not without giving reasons.58 The CJEU
52See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:0207:0209:EN:PDF.
53See F. Fabbrini and K. Granat, ‘Yellow Card, but no Foul’: the Role of the National Parliaments under the
Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike’ (2003)
Common Market Law Review 115–143.
54G. de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ (1998) Journal
of Common Market Studies 217.
55W. Vandenbruwaene, ‘Multi-Tiered Political Questions: The ECJ’s Mandate in Enforcing Subsidiarity’
(2012) Legisprudence 321–346.
56See, for example, case C-137/85 Maizena v BALM [1987] para 15 case C-339/92, ADM v Őlmühlen [1993]
para 15.
57See in the meanwhile the withdrawn protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty
on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts – with
a protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Official Journal C 340,
10/11/1997 P. 0105, under article 6) and article 296 TFEU stating that: ‘Where the Treaties do not specify
the type of act to be adopted, the institutions shall select it on a case-by-case basis, in compliance with
the applicable procedures and with the principle of proportionality.’
58Article 2 of Protocol 2 to the Lisbon Treaty on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. See also
Ombudsman decision in case 904/2014/OV on the European Commission’s public consultation prior to
its legislative proposal for a Regulation concerning the European single market for electronic communi-
cations: <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/nl/cases/decision.faces/en/60965/html.bookmark>.
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION 167
reviews the way in which the proportionality principle is taken into account
by the legislature, but the way in which it tests the proportionality of legislative
acts differs. In case of EU legal acts, a lenient ‘manifestly disproportionate’ test
is applied. With regard to national laws and regulations, the CJEU usually
undertakes a more rigorous and searching examination of the justification
for national regulatory intervention with a special focus on the availability
of less intrusive means to reach the policy goals.59
5.2. Legislative rationality testing in practice by the CJEU
As the European Union is taking on more regulatory functions, there is
increasing pressure on EU courts to act as regulatory watchdogs. Advocate
General Sharpston has even argued that EU laws lacking an impact assess-
ment should be held unlawful. Such laws would be arbitrary since they
have not been put to the test, which runs against the fact that legislative
choices need to be justified according to the proportionality principle.60
The CJEU, however, has not followed the Advocate General’s opinion.
The number of cases in which the CJEU tests the rationality of legislation
is still very limited. One reason might be that litigants who want to challenge
EU legal acts face at least three major limitations. First, restrictive rules on
jurisdictions and standing can make it difficult for them to ask the GC or
CJEU to assess whether EU legal acts comply with procedural requirements,
such as the need to conduct impact assessments or stakeholder consultations.
One of the obstacles is still that private parties only have standing against ‘an
act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to
them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and
does not entail implementing measures.’ In the Inuit case, the CJEU
decided that regulatory acts do not include legislative acts. The only way to
challenge a legislative act is to claim that the act is of direct and individual
concern to the applicant.61 This may prove to be difficult because of the
nature of legislative acts is their general application. Secondly, regulatory
quality requirements are often laid down in non-enforceable policy guide-
lines, recommendations and other forms of soft law of which the legal
status is unclear. Thirdly, so far EU courts have been quite hesitant to
conduct an intensive proportionality review of EU legislative acts, although
the CJEU seems to feel more confident to put national legislation to the
test.62
59W. Sauter, ‘Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?’ (2013) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2013-003,
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208467>.
60Case C-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] of AG Sharpston paras para 80–81.
61Case 538/11.
62S. Rose-Ackerman, S. Egidy and J. Fowkes, Due Process of Lawmaking: The United States, South Africa,
Germany, and the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2015) 237–238.
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An example of the latter is a Belgian case in which the CJEU clarified the
justifications, which Member States may legitimately invoke, in support of
certain measures restricting the free movement of university students.63 In
this case, the French Community had adopted a ‘numerus clausus’ require-
ment to restrict the number of non-resident French students in certain uni-
versity courses, such as the study of medicine, in order to prevent the
situation in which foreign students would return home after their studies,
leaving the Belgian government with a shortage of professionals. This case
was brought before the Belgian Constitutional Court, which put questions
to the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the principle of non-discrimi-
nation on the ground of nationality (Article 18 of the TFEU) and freedom of
movement (Article 21 of the TFEU), in conjunction with the provisions on the
mobility of students and trainees (Articles 165 and 166 of the TFEU). Sum-
marising the decision by the CJEU, the court found that:
The legislation at issue creates a difference in treatment between resident and
non-resident students, which constitutes indirect discrimination on the
ground of nationality as prohibited by the Treaty, unless there is an objective
justification. First of all the CJEU rejects as unfounded the justification of the
excessive burden on public finances caused by the influx of foreign students.
Regarding the risk that the quality of education would be jeopardised and
the quality of the public health system in the French Community would be
put at risk, the Court accepts that in principle national legislation which is
indirectly discriminatory may be justified by requirements of this nature, but
leaves it up to the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to assess the
facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether and to what
extent such legislation satisfies the requirements in question. However, the
CJEU provides guidance to the Belgian Constitutional Court to assist it in its
assessment by determining that this court will have to ascertain – on the
basis of an objective, detailed analysis and solid, consistent data provided by
the Belgian authorities – that there are genuine risks to public health. It must
then assess, in the light of the evidence provided by the competent authorities,
whether the legislation at issue can be regarded as appropriate for attaining the
objective of protecting public health and in particular whether a limitation of
the number of non-resident students can really bring about an increase in
the number of graduates ready to ensure the future availability of public
health services within the French Community. Finally, the CJEU decided that
the Constitutional Court will have to ascertain whether the objective in the
public interest relied upon could not be attained by less restrictive measures.
Although the CJEU does not (yet) seem to view impact assessments as an
essential requirement for the legality of legislative decisions in this case, it
does require a strengthening of the evidence-base for a numerus clausus.
Moreover, impact assessments can be important in the assessment of the pro-
portionality of legislative acts. Probably the most prominent example of how
63Case c-73/08 Bressol Chaverot v Gouvernement de la Communauté française [2010].
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION 169
this works stems from the Vodafone case, in which the CJEU had to decide
over the legality of Regulation 717/2007, which was adopted to fix the
maximum fees that mobile phone operators may charge for voice calls
made and received by users outside their own network by introducing a
‘Euro-tariff’.64 One of the central questions in the case is whether by imposing
a Euro-tariff, the EU-legislature had violated the principles of proportionality
and subsidiarity.
The CJEU answers this question by recalling that the legislature enjoys broad
discretion.65 Yet the CJEU points out that the exercise of that discretion
should be based on objective criteria.66 The Court found that before the Com-
mission proposed the regulation, it carried out an exhaustive impact assessment
of alternatives and evaluated the economic impact of various types of regu-
lations. The average retail charge for a roaming call in the EU at the time the
regulation was adopted was high (as the impact assessment pointed out:
more than five times higher than the actual cost of providing the wholesale
service) and the relationship between costs and prices was not such as
should have prevailed in fully competitive markets. The tariff provided for in
the regulation is significantly below that average charge and is set in relation
to the ceilings for the corresponding wholesale charges, so that the retail
charges reflect more accurately the costs incurred by providers. In those cir-
cumstances, according to the CJEU, an intervention limited in time (by a
sunset provision) in a market that is subject to competition, which makes it
possible, in the immediate future, to protect consumers against excessive
prices, such as that at issue, is proportionate to the aim pursued, even if it
might have negative economic consequences for certain operators. Because
Member States lack the regulatory competence in the wholesale market and
could not impose a price ceiling on a mobile operator located in another
Member State, compliance with the principle of subsidiarity was self-evident.
As Lenaerts has observed, Vodafone is interesting because it shows that the
CJEU applies the proportionality principle in a procedural fashion. Instead
of conducting a substantive review, the EU legislature was obliged to show
to the court that it had taken into account all relevant interests and examined
different regulatory options and their social, economic and environmental
impact before deciding to impose a price ceiling in the retail roaming
market.67 Brenncke noted that the further the CJEU goes in this procedural
review, the more it would alleviate the disadvantages of a marginal judicial
review of substantive issues.68 In Vodafone, the CJEU decided not to limit
64Case c-58/08 Vodafone and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
[2010].
65Only where an EU measure is manifestly inappropriate to the objectives it pursues will the CJEU rule that
it runs against the proportionality principle. See: Case c-189/01 Jippes and Others [2001] ECR I-5689,
paras 82–83; British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, para 123; Alliance for
Natural Health and Others, paragraph 52; and Case C–558/07 S.P.C.M. and Others [2009] ECR I-0000,
para 42.
66Para 52.
67Lenaerts (n 9) 7.
68M. Brenncke, Case note (2010) 47 CMLR 1793 at 1809.
170 R. VAN GESTEL AND J. DE POORTER
its scrutiny of legislation to a formal reading of the preamble of a regulation.
Whenever necessary, the CJEU will also take explanatory memoranda and
impact assessments into account to verify the evidence-base on which EU
laws rest.
Craig even seems to go further by claiming that if justificatory reasons for
the use of legislative power in an impact assessment are missing, with the
accompanying risk of competence creep, the CJEU should invalidate the leg-
islative instrument and send a clear message to political institutions that this
runs against the treaties. With hindsight, this is exactly what had happened in
the case Spain vs Council with regard to a Community support system for the
production of cotton as adopted by Regulation 1782/2003.69 This regulation
was challenged because of the proportionality principle by Spain, because
by fixing the amount of aid to 35% of the existing aid under the previous
scheme, the regulation would be unable to guarantee the profitability of the
cotton production. The CJEU sided with Spain and argued that the margin
of discretion left to the EU legislature does not exempt it from taking into con-
sideration the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was
supposed to regulate. The CJEU subsequently ruled that:
the institutions must at the very least be able to produce and set out clearly and
unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into account as the basis of
the contested measures of the act and on which the exercise of their discretion
depended.70
Here, the CJEU was clearly hinting at the absence of a proper impact assess-
ment. Since neither the Council nor the Commission had provided facts to
support the fixation of the amount of aid to 35%, the CJEU had no other
choice than to annul the contested Regulation, according to Judge Lenaerts.71
This does not imply, as Advocate General Sharpston seemed to argue, that
ignoring the results from an impact assessment would automatically invali-
date the underlying act, for the simple reason that in some cases legislative
drafts may undergo serious amendments after the impact assessment has
been conducted. That is probably why the CJEU took a more limited
approach in the Afton Chemical case where it required that amendments to
a legislative draft should be based on relevant scientific data, but without
requiring an impact assessment.72 However, if the CJEU cannot always rely
on the content of an impact assessment, how does it know that empirical
data or other scientific evidence is relevant, valid, and trustworthy?
A good example is the Test-Achats case in which the CJEU had to assess
whether article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113 exceeded the limits that compliance
69Case c-310/04 Spain v Council [2006] ECR 1-7285.
70Ibid., para 123.
71Lenaerts (n 9) 8.
72Case c-343/09 Afton Chemical v Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ECR I-07027.
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with the principle of proportionality imposes. Article 5(2) permits propor-
tionate differences in individuals’ insurance premiums and benefits where
the use of sex is a determining factor in the assessment of risks based on rel-
evant and accurate actuarial and statistical data. As stated in recital 18 to
Directive 2004/113, the use of actuarial factors related to sex was widespread
in the provision of insurance services at the time when the directive was
adopted. This was the actual rational underpinning of article 5(2) of Directive
2004/113. However, the CJEU ruled article 5(2) to be invalid upon the expiry
of an appropriate transitional period because article 5(1) of the same directive
provided that differences in premiums and benefits arising from the use of sex
as a factor in the calculation thereof must be abolished after a transition
period.
The CJEU apparently saw an inconsistency because article 5(2) initially
allowed a permanent exemption from the rule of unisex premiums. According
to Lenaerts, this judgment teaches us that the principle of proportionality is
not applied in an abstract fashion, ‘but as part of the legal and factual
context in which the contested measure operates’.73 Can this be seen in iso-
lation from the rational underpinning of the provision and consequences
this ruling will have for the insurance practice in the Member States? At
first sight, the ruling may be seen as a subtle decision that simply takes
away the basis for unjustified discrimination and an inconsistency within
the legislative act. Different premiums on the basis of risk are still allowed
but insurers ‘just’ have to find more objective grounds for calculating their
premiums, one is inclined to say. The story is not that simple though.
In terms of insurance premiums, Test Achats has led to largely insignificant
benefits for the former disadvantaged and to a dramatic increase in premiums
for those who were formerly considered to be the ‘better risks’.74 So, in the
end, all consumers (men and women) are probably worse off than before
the court ruling because the CJEU seems to have overlooked that there is
an inherent injustice in every statistical classification, be it based on sex,
age, wealth or even the type of car one drives. After all, the fact that
women in general live longer or that cars with more horsepower are generally
more often involved in accidents does not say anything about the life expect-
ancy of a particular women or does not mean that an individual car-owner
cannot drive a very fast car for years without getting into an accident. The
use of actuarial tables as such is always a matter of ‘injustice by generalisation’,
because an individual woman might live a far unhealthier life than her
husband and hence have a shorter life expectancy. The husband in his turn,
who is driving a sports car, may very well be able to show that he has a far
73Lenaerts (n 9)15.
74E. Schanze, ‘Injustice by Generalization: Notes on the Test-Achats Decision of the European Court of
Justice’ (2013) German Law Journal 423.
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better track record of safe driving than his neighbour who drives a super-safe
car but has lost his driver’s licence several times for drunken-driving. Accord-
ing to the actuarial tables, however, these individual particularities are irrele-
vant because it is the average risk that matters.
Discrimination in this case probably cannot be ruled out by a simple unisex
formula. If we, for example, allow different premiums for different types of
cars, and women happen to prefer certain types of cars to men due to
socio-psychological factors, this could represent a higher risks-category to
insurers that could still be calculated into the premium. Therefore, there
would remain indirect ‘discriminatory’ effects. If policy makers or legislators
want to rule out these indirect effects, highly complex, expensive, and privacy-
intrusive, psychometric and medical tests would need to be introduced to
replace the criterion of gender-differences and the effect they have, in
general, on certain types of behaviour. One may wonder to what extent the
EU legislature realised all this when prohibiting, in article 5(1) of Directive
2004/113, from 21 December 2007 onwards, the use of sex as a relevant
factor in the calculation of premiums and other benefits for the purposes of
insurance and related financial services.
Another case where the principle of equal treatment and the need for solid
scientific evidence played an important role is the case Léger v Ministre des
Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes and Etablissement fran-
çais du sang.75 This case dealt with the permanent deferral from blood
donation for men who have had sexual relations with other men because
those persons might be at a high risk of acquiring severe infectious diseases,
such as HIV. On 29 April 2009, a doctor at the French Blood Agency in Metz
refused the blood donation offered byMr Léger on the ground that he had had
sexual relations with another man, and that French law permanently excludes
blood donations from men who had had such relations. As Mr Léger chal-
lenged that decision, the Tribunal adminstratif de Strasbourg asked the
CJEU whether such a permanent deferral is compatible with Commission
Directive 2004/33/EC of 22 March 2004 implementing Directive 2002/98/
EC regarding certain technical requirements for blood and blood com-
ponents.76 According to this directive, persons whose sexual behaviour puts
them at a high risk of contracting severe infectious diseases that can be trans-
mitted by blood are subject to a permanent deferral from blood donation.
The CJEU first issued that the Tribunal administrative de Strasbourg needs
to determine whether, in France, there really is a high risk of acquiring severe
infectious diseases by blood donations due to sexual intercourse between men.
Secondly, the CJEU required the Tribunal to take account of the
75Case c–528/13 Léger v Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes and Etablissement
français du sang [2015].
76OJ 2004 L 91, p. 25.
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION 173
epidemiological situation in France, which, according to the French Govern-
ment and the Commission, has a specific character because the data submitted
to the Court, in the period 2003 to 2008, revealed that almost all HIV infec-
tions were due to sexual relations. Half of those newly infected were men who
had sexual relations with other men. During the same period, this group was
severely affected by HIV, with a much higher rate of infection than for the
heterosexual population in France and ranked as the highest in Europe.
Therefore, the Tribunal would have to ascertain whether, in the light of
current medical, scientific and epidemiological knowledge, these data are
reliable and still relevant.
According to the CJEU, even if the risk of acquiring diseases, such as HIV,
among homosexual men might be significantly higher, the question would
still be whether a permanent contraindication to blood donation is consistent
with the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as
laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The CJEU
recalled that any limitations on the exercise of the rights and freedoms
from the Charter may be imposed only if they are necessary and genuinely
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or by the need to
protect the rights and freedoms of others. The CJEU also ruled that although
permanent deferral provided for in French law helps to minimise the risk of
transmitting infectious diseases and, therefore, to the general objective of
ensuring a high level of health protection, the principle of proportionality
might still be violated. This could be the case if HIV can be detected by effec-
tive techniques able to ensure a high level of health protection for recipients.
The national court will have to verify whether such techniques exist, it being
understood that the tests must be carried out in accordance with the most
recent scientific and technical procedures. In case such techniques do not
yet exist, the Tribunal will have to ascertain whether there are less onerous
methods of ensuring a high level of health protection other than permanent
deferral from blood donation and, in particular, whether the questionnaire
and the individual interview with a medical professional are able to identify
high risk sexual behaviour more accurately.77
Although the logic of the CJEU is understandable, national courts are now
left with the problem of how to verify the risk of blood donations by homo-
sexual men. How should they decide whether, for example, questionnaires
and interviews with a medical professional are reliable less onerous
methods than deferral from blood donations? Or, to put it differently, how
would the national court need to decide when other scientific methods are
‘sufficient’ to minimise the risk of transmitting infectious diseases? What
would be the yardstick for that? In case one opts for permanent deferral,
77Case c–528/13 Léger v Ministre des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des femmes and Etablisse-
ment français du sang [2015], para 66.
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the risk of transmitting diseases is close to zero. It is highly likely that every
other scientific method of screening blood or blood donors will always keep
a residual risk. How could one objectively decide the amount of risk that is
still acceptable then? Moreover, how should the national court conduct
such a comparison between different (scientific) screening methods and are
courts capable of doing so?
How complicated may be investigative proceedings by national courts also
became clear in another recent CJEU case concerning the rights of homosex-
uals.78 The three litigants from Gambia (A), Afghanistan (B) and Uganda (C),
were disbelieved with respect to their sexual identity as gay men by Dutch
immigration authorities. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the
Dutch Council of State, considered that it needed guidance on whether
having self-identified that they were gay men, the mere fact of further inves-
tigation could infringe on Articles 3 (right to integrity) and 7 (right to respect
to private and family life) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. There-
fore, the court posed a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking:
What limits do Article 4 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals
or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection and the content of the protection granted, and the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 3 and 7 thereof,
impose on the method of assessing the credibility of a declared sexual orien-
tation, and are those limits different from the limits which apply to assessment
of the credibility of the other grounds of persecution and, if so, in what respect?
In other words, how does one prove a gay asylum claim? The CJEU is clear in
its decision about what is not allowed. Article 4 of Directive 2004/83, read in
light of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, must be interpreted as precluding the competent national authorities
from carrying out detailed questioning as to the sexual practices of an appli-
cant for asylum. Article 4 of Directive 2004/83, read in the light of Article 1 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, precludes the acceptance by the respon-
sible authorities of evidence, such as, the performance by the applicant of
homosexual acts, his submission to ‘tests’ with a view to establishing his
homosexuality or, yet, the production by him of films of such acts. Article
4(3) of Directive 2004/83 and Article 13(3)(a) of Directive 2005/85 must be
interpreted as precluding the competent national authorities from finding
that the statements of the applicant for asylum lack credibility merely
because the applicant did not rely on his declared sexual orientation on the
first occasion he was given to set out the grounds for persecution. In
summary, the assessments cannot be based on stereotypes, on the questioning
78Case c-148/13 Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie v UNHRCR [2014] and C-150/13, A, B and C v
Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie [2013].
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of sexual practices, on tests to identify sexual identity, or on the fact that the
applicants have delayed openness about his homosexuality in the asylum
process. Ultimately, the CJEU ruled that self-identification is the starting-
point and that the ‘assessment must take account of the individual situation
and personal circumstances of the applicant’ but what guidance does that
provide for national courts and immigration authorities as to how one
should deal with these types of claims?79 What sort of ‘evidence’ could
serve to filter out wrongful asylum claims in this respect? In addition, how
should one establish the validity of this evidence?
6. Intermediate conclusion
In the relationship between courts and legislatures, proportionality analysis is
about the justification of policy interventions and the effectiveness of regulat-
ory measures to achieve policy goals, which may have an effect on citizens’
rights. Assessing the proportionality of legislative interventions presupposes
a balancing between the aims of a legislative intervention and a rights pro-
vision or legitimate public interest that is limited by the intervention, which
inevitably involves political choices. What we have seen above, though, is
that this should not necessarily withhold courts from assessing the evi-
dence-base of legislation, although the way the CJEU and national courts
go about it, the tests they apply, and the intensity of judicial review, vary
according to the applicable framework: EU law, national law or ECHR law.
Nonetheless, on a somewhat higher level of abstraction, the essentials of a
proportionality test are not so different. As Stone Sweet and Mathews have
argued, proportionality analysis in general consists of four components: (1)
testing the legitimacy of a disputed regulatory measure by confirming the gov-
ernment is constitutionally authorized to act; (2) verifying that the means
adopted by the government are suitable and rationally related to stated legis-
lative objectives and, in principle, capable of meeting the aims pursued by the
legislature; (3) critically reviewing the necessity of the regulatory intervention
by ensuring that the measure does not curtail the rights of those affected any
more than is necessary for the government to achieve its stated goals, which
implies there are no less-intrusive alternatives available; (4) balancing between
the cost and benefits (in the broad sense and not only in monetary terms)
incurred by infringement of the right by the legislature, in order to determine
which constitutional values shall prevail.80
In particular, this last element makes it that proportionality assessment will
always remain a matter of sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. If judges
defer too much to legislators, they run the risk of selling out or balancing
79Ibid., para 57.
80A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) Colum-
bia Journal of Transnational Law 68–149.
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away fundamental rights for the sake of effective law and policy making,
whereas if courts are too restrictive and refuse to leave policy discretion to
legislators, judges will probably be accused of overruling democratic decision
making processes, which should be left to the legislative branch. To what
extent the scrutiny of legislation by courts on the basis of a proportionality
analysis will result in judicial activism ultimately depends on whether the
judiciary succeeds in setting up a constructive dialogue with the legislature.
As soon as we start seeing courts and legislatures more as partners in the
process of law making, it will become clear that abstract ex ante evaluation
of legislation by preferably independent advisory bodies or parliamentary
committees, and more concrete ex post evaluation by the judiciary could sup-
plement each other.81 Paradoxically, the more specific information policy
makers and legislators provide about the aims of the drafts, the choice of regu-
latory instruments and the methods of ex ante evaluation, the more intensive
a proportionality test by the judiciary may become. It is hard to predict if
legislators will be prepared to shoot themselves in the foot by limiting their
own discretionary powers once courts start to use voluntary ex ante evalu-
ations against them.
Comparing the case law from the CJEU with the one from Dutch highest
administrative courts, the message appears to be that the CJEU is more
inclined to take ex ante evaluations, empirical data and scientific evidence
on board than the Dutch courts. In the Netherlands, there is little enthusiasm
to apply a rigid proportionality test to legislative acts. Dutch courts in general
seem to leave much leeway for legislators and regulators to make policy
decisions without questioning the evidence-base of these decisions. Although,
strictly speaking, Dutch courts could apply a more rigid proportionality test
even to acts of parliament as soon as EU law or ECHR law is involved, the
legal culture is one of deference. This is probably not only caused by the
idea that the judiciary should respect the primacy of parliament, but also
because legislators are considered to be better equipped to scrutinise the val-
idity of the facts, data and science on which laws are built.
The latter raises three questions. The first one is: why would the CJEU
believe that it is more entitled to conduct a procedural review of national
81In Finland, for example, the introduction of ex post judicial review of legislation has strengthened the ex
ante review of legislation with regard to constitutional aspects. See K. Turori, ‘Combining Abstract ex
ante and Concrete ex post Review: The Finnish Model’ (Venice Commission 2010) see <http://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-UD(2010)011-e>. In the United
Kingdom, Murray Hunt has described how, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, parliament
has taken over a major part of the responsibility for the protection of the constitutionality of legislation
from the civil service in terms of prelegislative scrutiny. He believes this is first and foremost due to a
more active role of three parliamentary committees, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Del-
egated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee. The Parliamentary
Counsel has shifted its attention more towards preparing lawyers from the ministries for the scrutiny
that the three committees will employ. See M. Hunt, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ in
A. Horne, G. Drewry and D. Oliver (eds.), Parliament and the Law (Hart Publishers 2013) 223–250.
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legislation than domestic courts? Secondly, the CJEU case law shows that a
procedural review of legislation can sometimes be very unsatisfying, especially
when the evidence on which laws are based is controversial. In that case, a
procedural review might lead to ‘scientific avoidance’ as was the case in
both the blood donation and gay asylum examples. How should national
legislators, for instance, develop a reliable ‘test’ to filter out dangerous
blood transfusions from homosexual men or to detect fake gay asylum
claims without running the risk of discrimination? It is relatively easy to
suggest that alternative filtering mechanisms need to be considered by the
national authorities, but far more difficult to determine which methods are
proportionate and scientifically sound. Thirdly, it is interesting that the
Dutch Council of State’s legislative advisory division, which has much more
knowledge about ex ante evaluations of legislation than the administrative jur-
isdiction division, is more inclined to include empirical data and scientific evi-
dence in the assessment of the proportionality of legislative drafts.82 This can
only partly be explained by the fact that the advisory division is not bound by
article 120 of the constitution and has given itself a duty to also assess the
effectiveness and efficiency of legislative drafts.
What the CJEU and the Dutch courts have in common is that they are hesi-
tant to look beyond a procedural review in order to challenge the facts,
empirical data and scientific knowledge applied by legislators and regulators.
One of the explanations for this might very well be that both EU and national
courts feel insecure about the way in which the quality of this type of evidence
should be assessed and the consequences this could have for the position of
the judiciary. With regard to this, it might be helpful to look to the US for
inspiration because the US Supreme Court has developed certain standards
for judicial evaluation of empirical data and scientific evidence. These tests
are better known as the Daubert doctrine.
7. Lessons to be learned from Daubert
An interesting question is what European courts might learn from the eviden-
tiary standard announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, which
governs the admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts and state courts
in the US.83 In Daubert, the US Supreme Court made clear that courts need to
ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, with the reliability
test focusing on:
82There is, however, also criticism regarding the way the AD uses empirical data and scientific research in
its policy analytical review of legislation See R. van Gestel and J. Vranken, ‘Assessing the Accuracy of Ex
Ante Evaluation through Feedback Research: A Case Study’ in J. Verschuuren (ed.), The Impact of Legis-
lation: A Critical Analysis of Ex Ante Evaluation (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 199–229.
83509 US 579 (1993). Not every state court is always very strict in applying the US Supreme Court Daubert
doctrine.
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(a) testability or falsifiability;
(b) peer review and publication;
(c) the known or potential rate of error; and
(d) the degree of acceptance in the scientific community in a certain field.
In essence, Daubert aims to ensure that scientific evidence brought
before courts by litigating parties meets the same standards of reliability
that the relevant scientific field itself would require. After Daubert
v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, the case of General Electric v. Joiner added
that the appellate court should review the trial court on its use of the
Daubert factors.84 This confirmed that courts are seen as ‘gate keepers’
responsible for filtering out the use of ‘junk science’ in the law-making
process. Additionally, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael added that the
Daubert test applies to all fields of expert evidence and not only ‘science’
but also, for instance, to social and economic studies.85 So far, however,
the Daubert doctrine does not apply to legislation and agency regulation
but it is contested whether the introduction of a ‘regulatory Daubert’ rule
is needed (see hereafter).
Scholars have debated the overall efficacy of the Daubert test. Some look at
it with great scepticism, mainly due to the vagueness of the criteria used to
filter out substandard evidence.86 This also appears to be the conclusion
from a survey among judges, who in general seem to find the criteria
useful, but hard to apply in a consistent manner.87 This is why some scholars
argue that the legislature should provide specific guidelines to test the quality
of the expert evidence.88 At the same time, many scholars feel that Daubert
has at least made courts more sensitive and critical with regard to the screen-
ing of empirical data and scientific evidence more in general.89 Moreover,
Breyer has argued that the search for law reflecting a solid evidence base
should not be mistaken for a search for scientific precision:
One could not hope to replicate the subtleties and uncertainties that character-
ize good scientific work. A judge is not a scientist and a courtroom is not a lab-
oratory. […] Rather, the law must seek decisions that fall within the outer
84522 US 136 (1997).
85526 US 137 (1999).
86L. Heinzerling, ‘Doubting Daubert’ (2006) 14 Journal of Law and Policy 65 and E. Beecher-Monas, ‘Blinded
by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence’ (1998) 71 Temple Law Review 55.
87S. Gatowski et al., ‘Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a
Post-Daubert World’ (2001) 25 Law & Human Behaviour 433.
88C. Welch, ‘Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion’ (2006) Harvard Journal
of Law and Public Policy 1085. S. Ramsey and R. Kelly, ‘Assessing Social Science Studies: Eleven Tips for
Judges and Lawyers’ (2006) 40 Family Law Quarterly 367.
89E. Cheng and A. Yoon, ‘Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards’ (2005)
91 Vanderbilt Law Review 471 and E. Hammon Meazell, ‘Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled
Judicial Review of Legislative Science’ (2009) 84 Indiana Law Journal 239, 253.
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boundaries that mark the scientifically sound decisions that, roughly speaking,
approximately reflect the scientific ‘state of the art’.90
This being said, one has to be aware of the fact that the Daubert doctrine is no
panacea. US Courts have so far consistently rejected applying the Daubert cri-
teria to judicial review of agency decision making, although a few decisions,
mostly from the Seventh Circuit, have invoked the test to inform their
review of agency determinations, even while acknowledging that Daubert
itself is not binding for regulatory agencies.91 In the meantime, the foun-
dations of these separate institutional worlds have begun to collide due to
the Information Quality Act (IQA) of 2001.92 The IQA imposes an eviden-
tiary screening process on regulatory agencies that looks somewhat like the
Daubert test and provides stakeholders in the regulatory process with the
opportunity to file complaints for ‘correction’ of information disseminated
by agencies they believe is unreliable. This correction process is aimed at
excluding unreliable information from public dissemination or agency use
and includes an appeal process inside the agency.
Those in favour of introducing a Daubert test in the realm of judicial
review of laws and regulations claim that good science is good science, regard-
less of the context. As Raul and Dwyer put it:
The same ‘good science’ rationale should also apply to judicial review of the
science underlying regulatory decision-making. Indeed, if private litigants are
entitled to rules requiring sound science to protect parochial interests, certainly
the public should be equally assured that good science is the foundation for
national action.93
Opponents of the extension of the Daubert test to judicial review of regulation
have had the upper hand so far. First, they object because regulatory decision-
making is much more forward looking compared with judicial law-making,
anticipating possible risks that may or may not present themselves in the
future.94 Secondly, some scholars argue that judges are lacking the expertise
to assess scientific evidence, while legislators and regulators would be more
capable of doing so. Judges usually lack scientific or technical backgrounds
themselves and, unlike regulatory agencies and legislators, courts simply
cannot wait for new scientific information to become available before decid-
ing the best course of action. They simply do not have the luxury of being able
90S. Breyer, ‘The Interdependence of Science and Law’ (1998) 82 Judicature 24 (emphasis is in the original).
91D. Bernstein, ‘What to do about Federal Agency Science: Some Doubts about Regulatory Daubert’ (2015)
George Mason Law Review 549.
92W. Wagner, ‘Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies through the Information Quality Act’ (2004)
Journal of Law and Policy 589–617.
93A. Raul and J. Dwyer, ‘“Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by
Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law’ (2003) Law & Contemporary Problems 7.
94D. Bernstein, ‘What to do about Federal Agency Science: Some Doubts about Regulatory Daubert’ (2005)
George Mason Law Review 553.
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to take their time. Besides, courts sometimes have difficulties with science
because of the nature of the adversarial system. Parties have every incentive
to produce evidence favourable to their respective sides, regardless of the
quality of the evidence and the science on which it is based.95 Thirdly,
some experts feel that judicial interference with the way regulatory agencies
incorporate empirical data and scientific evidence in the rule-making
process runs the risk of getting involved in policy-decisions that may affect
judicial objectivity.96
Some counter-arguments are also available. After all, not only legislators
and regulators are dealing with problems that may present themselves in
the future, in particular the highest courts often set precedents which intro-
duce new rules that go far beyond the interests of individual litigants. In
that case, it is important for courts to anticipate the consequences of their
decisions while things may easily go wrong, as for instance the Test Achats
case of the CJEU clearly shows. It is certainly true that most highest courts
have not invested as much as legislatures and regulatory agencies in
methods of ex ante evaluation, but this does not imply that courts should
be given carte blanch when developing new legal rules. Courts are just as
responsible as legislators to undertake a proper ‘Folgenorientierung’ and
inform themselves with,97 for example, amicus curiae briefs or independent
court-appointed experts in case they consider introducing new law. In case
one would feel that courts are not equipped to do so, we perhaps need to
think how to better facilitate the judiciary on this point instead of avoiding
the issue. As far as institutional disadvantages are concerned, the proposition
that legislatures are better equipped to engage in careful fact-finding is usually
taken for granted and leads to courts’ traditional deference to the legislature in
case of problems surrounded by scientific uncertainty. Meazzel has argued
that a more critical examination is needed of the comparative abilities of
courts and legislatures to incorporate ‘good science’ into their decision-
making. He doubts whether courts are always more poorly situated to
resolve the type of scientific questions underlying regulatory decision-
making than legislators and regulators.98
On the surface, courts face some hurdles with respect to scientific evidence
that legislatures can avoid. Although this argument is frequently used as a
rationale for judicial restraint, there seems to be little empirical evidence
95W. Kat, ‘Roper and the Scientific Amicus’ (2008–9) 49 Jurimetrics 253. Also E. Hammon Meazell, ‘Scientific
Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial Review of Legislative Science’ (2009) 84 Indiana Law Journal
239, 255.
96T. McGarity, ‘On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk Assessment’ (2003) Law & Con-
temporary Problems 155, 156. Also D.E. Bernstein, ‘What to do about Federal Agency Science: Some
Doubts about Regulatory Daubert’ (2015) George Mason Law Review 553.
97C. Coles, Folgenorientierung im richterlichen Eintscheidungsprozeß (Peter Land 1991).
98H. Meazell, ‘Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial Review of Legislative Science’ (2009)
84 Indiana Law Journal 239, 242.
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that legislators and regulatory agencies are better fact finders than courts. Of
course, the latter usually have more time, facilities and resources than courts.
However, the fact that legislatures and regulatory agencies have better tools at
their disposal does not lead to the conclusion that these tools are always used
effectively. The legislative process suffers from some weaknesses that are
different from those of the judicial procedure. Legislators and regulatory
agencies may, for instance, have an incentive to present science in a way
that fits best a particular political decision because the initiators of a certain
law have an interest in the outcome. This is why providing counter-arguments
and counter-evidence is often left to third parties. In the European context,
the Commission may leave the reasons against a certain regulation or direc-
tive to the European Parliament and a regulatory agency could leave it to
representatives of the Member States or to NGOs. Courts usually do not
have this problem since they are supposed to take an independent position.
Furthermore, courts normally have the advantage of being able to decide
with hindsight, which makes it much easier to look at the effects of regulatory
decisions and the strengths of the evidence on which these are based.
An illustrative example of the latter is the prohibition of handheld (mobile
phone) calling while driving, which was first introduced in the US but has
now spread to many other countries in the world. The aim of this type of
legislation was to prevent road-users from accidents. In an interesting an
enlightening empirical study, Robert Halm and Patrick Dudley have shown
that the risks and costs of handheld calling while driving probably do not out-
weigh the benefits, especially if we compare calling to similar potentially dis-
tracting activities for drivers that have not been prohibited.99 Apart from that,
the prohibition of handheld calling might very well send the wrong signal to
drivers that using a hands-free device is perfectly safe, while this is certainly
not the case. Crash data and numerous empirical studies have shown that it is
not so much the use of handheld devices as such that increases the risks of
having an accident, but the fact that the conversation distracts our atten-
tion.100 Why should a court, when confronted with a plaintiff challenging
a statute like this, not have the opportunity to assess the scientific rationality
of the statute?
One possible answer to this last question could be that the scientific ration-
ality of the statute is usually intertwined with the policy decisions underlying
the statute. As a result, in cases like this, scientific evidence plays only a sup-
porting role in illustrating what is within the realm of reasonableness. Take
the Léger-case. Mister Léger challenged the decision of a doctor at the
99R. Hahn and P. Dudley, ‘The Disconnect Between Law and Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Drivers and
Cell Phones’ (2003) Administrative Law Review 127–185.
100See for example US National Safety Council, ‘Understanding the Distracted Brain. Why Driving while
using Hands-free Cell Phones is Risky Behaviour,’ National Safety Council White Paper April 2012.
See: <http://www.nsc.org/DistractedDrivingDocuments/Cognitive-Distraction-White-Paper.pdf>.
182 R. VAN GESTEL AND J. DE POORTER
French Blood Agency in Metz who refused his blood donation on the grounds
that he had had sexual relations with another man, and that French law
excludes blood donations from homosexuals. In this case, the CJEU was
not called upon to consider whether there was a dispute as to the efficacy
of the measure. Instead, it was asked to survey evidence reflecting the avail-
able scientific information to decide whether it was reasonable to apply the
measure in its present form. The plaintiff was in fact asking to assess the
proportionality of a measure that permanently excludes homosexuals
from blood donations. Here, a degree of judicial deference seems to
be appropriate. As Bernstein asserts, this partly concerns a question of
policy-making. However, is this enough reason for a total avoidance of
scientific information? Here, too, we would argue that the court should
not be called upon to consider what measure is most appropriate in such
a situation. We see no reason, though, why in such a case, national
courts would be unable to survey scientific information in order to assess
whether the standard of evidence by blood banks is proportionate in
relation to the limitation of the fundamental rights of the donors. Is this
not exactly what the CJEU would require from national courts? Just
suppose that the Dutch proposal for a ban on the wearing of burqas or
niqabs had been pushed through parliament by the former coalition gov-
ernment. Should a court then not be allowed to assess the proportionality
of that measure in case Muslim women would challenge this law as an
infringement of their freedom of religion? In case the answer is affirmative,
why should courts in such cases not be allowed to take the advisory opinion
of the AD of the Council of State into account, which criticised the evi-
dence-base on which the legislative draft was based?
8. Conclusion
Returning to the research question, we asked ourselves to what extent a pro-
portionality review of laws and regulations by the judiciary requires that
courts assess the methodological rigour of the ex ante evaluations conducted
during the preparation of laws and regulations or scrutinise the empirical data
or scientific evidence used to underpin regulatory decisions.
Our overall conclusion is that the CJEU increasingly finds it necessary to
conduct a procedural review of legislation in which it takes ex ante evaluations
into account but the court does not go as far yet as to scrutinise the underlying
data or the scientific evidence on which consultations and impact assessments
rest. The problem with this is that in cases where ex ante evaluations are of
poor quality, because the underlying data or scientific evidence are corrupted,
this will negatively affect the CJEU’s judgment and support the idea that pre-
legislative scrutiny is a matter of box ticking. For Dutch courts, the situation is
different. They are not yet willing to include ex ante evaluations or empirical
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data in a proportionality review of legislation but, interestingly enough, the
Advisory Division of the Council of State in its ex ante evaluation of legis-
lation occasionally does refer to empirical data and scientific evidence to chal-
lenge, for example, the necessity and suitability of certain legislative
instruments to fulfil the aims of the legislature. This raises the question:
why do courts not use this information?
Courts will have more opportunities to function as regulatory watchdogs
and intensify their proportionality review in cases where legislators and reg-
ulators are prepared to provide more specific information about the aims of
the drafts, the choice of regulatory instruments, and the methods of ex ante
evaluation they apply. Moreover, as soon as there are going to be more
internal quality control mechanisms with regard to legislative draft, such as
the Regulatory scrutiny board at the EU-level, courts might in the future
rely more on a meta-review by assessing how rigorously such bodies
conduct an internal subsidiarity and proportionality review.101 However,
the disadvantage of such a purely procedural review is twofold. First, it
would send a signal to legislators and regulators that more openness about
the policy aims and accountability with regard to methods of ex ante evalu-
ation applied in the drafting process might be used against them by courts
undertaking a proportionality review. Second, a mere procedural review of
the rule-making process might overlook flaws in the empirical data or scien-
tific evidence on which laws and regulations are built, resulting in later regu-
latory failures.
The Daubert test developed by the US Supreme Court could provide
inspiration for the CJEU and for national courts as to how the quality of
the legislative facts, empirical data and scientific evidence could be evaluated
by the CJEU and by national courts. Simultaneously, Daubert also reveals
that in case courts want to review the evidence-base on which laws and regu-
lations rest on a more abstract regulatory level, the judiciary will probably
also need to invest more in methods to anticipate future consequences of
judicial decisions that are meant to correct or redirect legislative decisions.
Nevertheless, we believe that courts could demand more clarity as to how
legislators and regulators use facts, empirical data and scientific evidence
as a basis for regulatory decisions with regard to the necessity, suitability
and proportionality of the measures being taken. This could, for example,
be done by requiring that the underpinning of legislative drafts rely more
on independent research that is carried out according to accepted
methods in the field, while avoiding cherry picking or otherwise trying to
steer the outcomes.
101A. Meuwese and S. Gomtsian, ‘Regulatory Scrutiny or Subsidiarity and Proportionality’ (2015) Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law 490.
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